TAG Bulletin: Q2 2020

[sorangutan]

This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q2 of 2020. It was last updated on August 5, 2020.

April

We terminated 16 YouTube channels, 1 advertising account and 1 AdSense account as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Iran. The campaign was linked to the Iranian state-sponsored International Union of Virtual Media (IUVM) network, and posted content in Arabic related to the U.S. response to COVID-19 and content about Saudi-American relations. We received leads from FireEye and Graphika that supported us in this investigation.

We terminated 15 YouTube channels and 3 blogs as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign posted content in English and Russian about the EU, Lithuania, Ukraine, and the U.S., similar to the findings in a recent Graphika report called Secondary Infektion. We received leads from Graphika that supported us in this investigation.

We terminated 7 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign posted content in Russian, German, and Farsi about Russian and Syrian politics and the U.S. response to COVID-19. This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.

We terminated 186 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China. These channels mostly uploaded spammy, non-political content, but a small subset posted political content primarily in Chinese similar to the findings in a recent Graphika report, including content related to the U.S. response to COVID-19. 

We terminated 3 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Iran. The campaign posted content in Bosnian and Arabic that was critical of the U.S. and the People's Mujahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI). This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.

May

We terminated 1,098 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China. These channels mostly uploaded spammy, non-political content, but a small subset posted political content primarily in Chinese similar to the findings in a recent Graphika report, including content related to the U.S. response to COVID-19. We received leads from Graphika that supported us in this investigation. 

We terminated 47 YouTube channels and 1 AdSense account as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign posted content in a coordinated manner primarily in Russian about domestic Russian and international policy issues. This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.

June

We terminated 1,312 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China. These channels mostly uploaded spammy, non-political content, but a subset posted political content primarily in Chinese similar to the findings in a recent Graphika report, including content related to racial justice protests in the U.S. This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Twitter. 

We terminated 17 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign posted comments in Russian in a coordinated manner under a small set of Russian language videos. This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Twitter.

We banned 3 Play Developers and terminated 1 advertising account as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation. The campaign was posting news content in English and French, targeting audiences in Africa. We found evidence of this campaign being tied to the PR company Ureputation based in Tunisia. This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.

https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q2-2020/